Abstract-Administrative Role Based Access Control (ARBAC) models deal with how to manage user-role assignments (URA), permission-role assignments (PRA), and rolerole assignments (RRA). A wide-variety of approaches have been proposed in the literature for URA, PRA and RRA. In this paper, we propose attribute-based administrative models that unify many prior approaches for URA and PRA. The motivating factor is that attributes of various RBAC entities such as admin users, regular users and permissions can be used to administer URA and PRA in a highly-flexible manner. We develop an attribute-based URA model called AURA and an attribute-based PRA model called ARPA. We demonstrate that AURA and ARPA can express and unify many prior URA and PRA models.
I. INTRODUCTION
Role-based access control (RBAC) [1] , [2] is a welladopted access control model in enterprise settings [3] , and a well-studied access control model in the academic community [4] . However, administration of user-role, permission-role and role-role assignments (often referred to as Administrative RBAC or ARBAC) is both a critical and challenging task [5] . For example, ARBAC focusses on assigning/revoking users to/from roles, permission to/from roles, etc. Many approaches have been proposed in the literature for ARBAC [5] - [9] . Most of these approaches are role-driven-for example, in URA97 [5] , user-role assignment is determined based on prerequisite roles of the target user. Similarly, in URA99 [6] , it is determined based on the target users' current membership in mobile and/or immobile roles.
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) has recently gained significant attention because of its flexibility [10] - [14] . Moreover, it has proven to have the ability to represent different access control models [12] , as well as application in different technology domains such as cloud and Internet of Things (IoT) [15] , [16] . However, using ABAC for administrative purposes has not been thoroughly explored. In this paper, we investigate an attribute-based approach for administration of RBAC. In the context of ARBAC, attributes allow for more flexibility in specifying the conditions under which users and permissions can be assigned to roles. For instance, the notions of prerequisite roles in ARBAC97 [5] , mobility of roles in ARBAC99 [6] , and organization unit in AR-BAC02 [7] can be captured as user attributes. Similarly, the notion of administrative roles in the above models and the notion of administrative unit in Uni-ARBAC [9] can be captured as attributes of administrative users.
This allows for the attribute-based models we develop to express any of these ARBAC models and beyond. That is, it allows our attribute-based models to express any combination of features from prior models, and new features that are not intuitively expressible in those prior models. Thus, this work is motivated largely by two critical factors: (a) since administrative RBAC has been fairly explored in the literature, it is timely to explore unification of these works into a coherent model that can be configured to express prior models and beyond, and (b) a unified model can be analyzed once for various desirable security properties, and a single codebase can be generated to express prior models and beyond.
The contributions of this paper are two-fold:
• We develop an attribute-based administrative model for user-role assignment (AURA) and permissionrole assignment (ARPA). AURA deals with assigning/revoking users to/from roles that is determined based on the attributes of the administrative user and those of the regular (target) user. ARPA deals with assigning/revoking permissions to/from roles that is determined based on the attributes of the administrative user and those of the target permission(s).
• Demonstrate that AURA and ARPA are capable of expressing many prior approaches to URA and PRA such as ARBAC97, ARBAC99, ARBAC02, UARBAC, and Uni-ARBAC. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss related work. In Section III, AURA and ARPA models are presented as units of attribute based administration of RBAC (AARBAC). Sections IV and V present algorithms that translate prior URA and PRA instances into equivalent AURA and ARPA instances. We conclude in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
This paper focuses on attribute-based user-role assignment (AURA) and attribute-based permission-role assignment (ARPA). In particular, we scope-out role-role assignment as future work. Therefore, in the following discussion, we limit to related works on URA and PRA.
ARBAC97 [5] , ARBAC99 [6] , ARBAC02 [7] , Uni-ARBAC [9] and UARBAC [8] are some of the prominent prior works in administrative RBAC. All these models deal with user-role and permission-role assignments.
In all these models, the policy for assigning a user or a permission to a role is specified based on an explicit and a fixed set of properties of the relevant entities that are involved in the decision-making process, namely, the administrative user, the target role, and the regular user (or the permission) that is assigned to the role. For example, in URA97, the properties that are used include the admin role of the administrative user and the current set of roles of the regular user. Similarly, in UARBAC, the properties include a relationship based on access modes between the admin user, the target role and the regular user. However, because AURA and ARPA are based on non-explicit and a varying set of properties (attributes) of the relevant entities that are involved in the decion-making process, these models are more flexible.
A closely related work is that of Al-Kahtani et. al [17] , which presents a family of models for automated assignment of users to roles based on user attributes. The primary focus of their work is user-role assignment based on user attributes. Our models take a more holistic approach to RBAC administration based on attributes of various RBAC entities such as regular users, admin users and permissions. The major advantage of taking such an approach is that our models both subsume prior approaches to RBAC administration, and allow for specification of novel policies.
The benefits of integrating attributes into an RBAC operational model has been investigated in the literature [10] , [18] , [19] . However, our work focuses on advantages of using an attribute-based approach for RBAC administration. Also, attribute-based access control [11] , [12] , [20] , [21] has been well-studied. Such prior ABAC works primarily focus on operational aspects of access control-that is, making decisions when a user requests access to an object.
III. AARBAC: AURA AND ARPA MODELS
In this section, we present our approach for attributebased administrative RBAC (AARBAC). We develop an attribute-based administrative model for user-role assignment (called AURA) and an attribute-based administrative model for permission-role assignment (called ARPA). Figure 1 illustrates AURA and ARPA. The entities collectively involved in AURA and ARPA include admin users and their associated attributes, regular users and their attributes, permissions and their attributes, roles with a hierarchy, and the operations. In AURA, the admin users control the URA relation, while in ARPA, they control the PRA relation. Thus, in AURA, authorization decisions for assigning a regular user to a role, which is an example of an operation, is made based on attributes of the admin user and that of the regular user. In ARPA, authorization decisions for assigning a permission to a role is made based on attributes of the admin user and that of the permission. In the following subsections, the AURA and ARPA models are presented in detail. Table I presents the formal AURA model. As illustrated in Figure 1 , the entities involved in AURA include regular users (USERS), admin users (AU), roles (ROLES) with a role hierarchy (RH), and admin operations (AOP). The goal of AURA is allow for an admin user in AU to perform an admin operation such as -USERS is a finite set of regular users.
-AU is a finite set of administrative users.
-AOP is a finite set of admin operations such as assign and revoke.
-ROLES is a finite set of regular roles.
-RH ⊆ ROLES × ROLES, a partial ordering on the set ROLES.
We assume a system maintained user attribute function called roles that specifies the roles assigned to various regular users as follows: -assigned_roles : USERS → 2 ROLES -UATT is a finite set of regular user attribute functions.
-AATT is a finite set of administrative user attribute functions.
-For each att in UATT ∪ AATT, Scope(att) is a finite set of atomic values from which the range of the attribute function att is derived.
-attType : UATT ∪ AATT → {set, atomic}, which specifies whether the range of a given attribute is atomic or set valued.
-Each attribute function maps elements in USERS and AU to atomic or set values. -For each att ∈ UATT ∪ AATT, if is_ordered(att) = True, H att ⊆ Scope(att) × Scope(att), a partially ordered attribute hierarchy, and H att = φ, else, if is_ordered(att) = False, H att = φ (For some att ∈ UATT ∪ AATT for which attType(att) = set and is_ordered(att) = True, if {a, b}, {c, d} ∈ 2 Scope(att) (where a, b, c, d ∈ Scope(att)), we infer {a,
) AURA model allows an administrator to perform an operation on a single user or a set of users at a time. The authorization rule for performing an operation on a single user is as follows: For each op in AOP, is_authorizedU op (au: AU, u : USERS, r : ROLES) specifies if the admin user au is allowed to perform the operation op (e.g. assign, revoke, etc.) between the regular user u and the role r. This rule is written as a logical expression using attributes of the admin user au and attributes of the regular user u.
The authorization rule for performing an operation on a set of users is as follows:
For each op in AOP, is_authorizedU op (au: AU, χ : 2 USERS , r : ROLES) specifies if the admin user au is allowed to perform the operation op (e.g. assign, revoke, etc.) between the users in the set χ and the role r.
Here χ is a set of users that can be specified using a set-builder notation, whose rule is written using user attributes.
assign/revoke in AOP between a regular user in USERS and a role in ROLES, by using attributes of various entities. To meet this goal, we define a set of attribute functions for the regular users (UATT) and admin users (AATT). One of the motivations for AURA is that we wanted AURA to have the ability to capture the features of prior URA models such as URA97, URA99, and URA02. As we will see, to this end, we only need to include attributes for regular users and admin users. While one can envision attributes for other entities in AURA such as attributes for AOP, we limit the scope of model design based on the above-mentioned motivation. In addition, we also assume a system maintained user attribute function called assigned_roles, which maps each user to set of roles currently assigned to them. Although the notion of roles can be captured as a user attribute function in UATT, we made this design choice in order to reflect the fact that role is not an optional attribute in the context of AURA.
The attribute functions (called simply attributes from now on) are defined as a mapping from its domain (USERS or AU as the case may be) to its range. The range of an attribute att, which can be atomic or set valued, is derived from a specified set of scope of atomic values denoted Scope(att). Whether an attribute is atomic or set valued is specified by a function called attType. Also, the scope of an attribute can be either ordered or unordered, which is specified by a function called is_ordered. If an attribute att is ordered, we require that a corresponding hierarchy, denoted H att , be specified on its scope Scope(att). H att is a partial ordering on Scope(att). Note that, even in the case of a set valued attribute att, the hierarchy H att is specified on Scope(att) instead of 2 Scope(att) . We infer the ordering between two set values given an ordering on atomic values as explained in Table I . (Note that H * att denotes the reflexive transitive closure of H att .) AURA supports two ways to select a set of regular users for assigning a role. The first one allows an admin user to identify a single regular user, a role and perform an operation such as assign. The second one allows an admin user to identify a set of regular users, a role and perform an operation such as assign for all those regular users. In this case, the selection criteria for the set of regular users can be specified using a set-builder notation whose rule is stated using the regular users' attributes. For example, is_authorizedU assign (au, {u | u ∈ USERS ∧ aunit ∈ admin_unit(u)}, r) would specify a policy for an admin user au who identifies the set of all users who belong to the admin unit aunit in order to assign a role r to all those users. Finally, the authorization rule is specified as a usual logical expression on the attributes of admin users and those of regular users in question. Examples can be seen in sections IV and V.
The ARPA model presented in Table II is very similar to the AURA model. The main difference is that since the focus of ARPA is about permission role assignment, it replaces regular users (USERS) in AURA with permissions (PERMS). Similarly, it replaces user attributes (UATT) with permission attibutes (PATT). Again, the motivation is that in order to capture the features of prior PRA models such as those in PRA02, UARBAC and Uni-ARBAC, we only need attributes for admin users and permissions. Similar to AURA, ARPA also supports two ways to select permissions to which an admin user can assign a role. A set of permissions can be selected using a set-builder notation whose rule is specified using permission attributes. Finally, the authorization rule is specified as a logical expression in the usual way over the attributes of the admin users and those of the permissions.
IV. MAPPING PRIOR URA MODELS IN AURA
In this section, we demonstrate that AURA can intuitively simulate the features of prior URA models. In particular, we have developed concrete algorithms that can convert any instance of URA97, URA99, URA02, the URA model in UARBAC, and the URA model in Uni-ARBAC into an equivalent instance of AURA. In the following sections also presents example instances of each of the prior URA models and their corresponding instances in AURA/ARPA model followed by a formal mapping alorithms.
A. URA97 in AURA 1) URA97 Instance: In this section we present an example instance for URA97. Sets and Functions:
• USERS = {u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 2 and, cr 2 =x 1 ∨ (x 2 ∧ x 3 ) be two prerequisite conditions. Prerequisite condition cr 1 is evaluated as follows:
For any u in USERS undertaken for assignment, TABLE II  ARPA MODEL -AU is a finite set of administrative users.
-PERMS is a finite set of permissions.
-PATT is a finite set of permission attribute functions.
-For each att in AATT ∪ PATT, Scope(att) is a finite set of atomic values from which the range of the attribute function att is derived.
-attType : AATT ∪ PATT → {set, atomic}, which specifies whether the range of given attribute is atomic or set valued.
-Each attribute function maps elements in AU and PERMS to atomic or set values.
-is_ordered : AATT ∪ PATT → {True, False}, specifies if the scope is ordered for each of the attributes.
-For each att ∈ AATT ∪ PATT, if is_ordered(att) = True, H att ⊆ Scope(att) × Scope(att), a partially ordered attribute hierarchy, and H att = φ else, if is_ordered(att) = False, H att = φ (For some att ∈ PATT ∪ AATT for which attType(att) = set and is_ordered(att) = True, if {a, b}, {c, d} ∈ 2 Scope(att) (where a, b, c, d ∈ Scope(att)), we infer {a,
) ARPA model allows an administrator to perform an operation on a single permission or a set of permissions at a time. The authorization rule for performing an operation on a single permission is as follows: For each op in AOP, is_authorizedP op (au: AU, p : PERMS, r : ROLES) specifies if the admin user au is allowed to perform the operation op (e.g. assign, revoke, etc.) between the permission p and the role r. This rule is written as a logical expression using attributes of the admin user au and attributes of the permission p.
The authorization rule for performing an operation on a set of permissions is as follows.
For each op in AOP, is_authorizedP op (au: AU, χ : 2 PERMS , r : ROLES) specifies if the admin user au is allowed to perform the operation op (e.g. assign, revoke, etc.) between the permissions in the set of χ and the role r. Here χ is a set of permissions that can be specified using a set-builder notation, whose rule is written using permission attributes. cr 2 is evaluated as follows: For any u in USERS undertaken for assignment,
Let can_assign and can_revoke be as follows: can_assign = {(ar 1 , cr 1 , {x 4 , x 5 }), (ar 1 , cr 2 , {x 6 })} can_revoke = {(ar 1 , {x 4 , x 5 , x 6 })} 2) Equivalent URA97 Instance in AURA: In this segment AURA instance equivalent to aforementioned URA97 instance in presented based on the AURA model depicted in Table I . Sets and functions
Scope(aroles) = {ar 1 , ar 2 }, attType(aroles) = set, is_ordered(aroles) = True, H aroles = {(ar 1 , ar 2 )} • aroles(u 3 ) = {ar 1 }, aroles(u 4 ) = {ar 2 } Authorization rules for user-role assignment and revocation for the given instance can be expressed respectively, as follows: -is_authorizedU assign (au : AU, u : USERS, r : ROLES) ≡ ((∃ar ≥ ar 1 ). ar ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ {x 4 , x 5 
Step 4: /* Construct revoke rule for AURA */ a. revoke_formula = φ b. For each (ar, Z) ∈ can_revoke 97 revoke_formula' = revoke_formula ∨ ((∃ar' ≥ ar). ar' ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ Z) c. auth_revoke = is_authorizedU revoke (au : AU A , if symbol is a role and in the form x (i.e., the user holds role x)
4:
else if symbol is a role and in the formx (i.e., the user doesn't hold role x)
6:
else 8:
rule_string' = rule_string + symbol /* where a symbol is a ∧ or ∨ logical operator */ 9: end if is set to null. Admin user attribute aroles captures the notion of admin roles in URA97. Step 
imp_mob_mem(u) = φ k. For each (u, Mr) ∈ UA 99 and for each r > r',
A and for each r > r' /* Construct assign rule in AURA */ a. assign-mob-formula = φ b. For each (ar, cr, Z) ∈ can-assign-M 99 , assign-mob-formula' = assign-mob-formula ∨ ((∃ar' ≥ ar). ar' ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ Z ∧ (translate(cr, assign))) c. auth_mob_assign = is_authorizedU mob-assign (au : AU A , u : USERS A ,
Step 4: /* Construct revoke rule in AURA */ a. revoke-mob-formula = φ b. For each (ar, cr, Z) ∈ can-revoke-M 99 , revoke-mob-formula' = revoke-mob-formula ∨ ((∃ar' ≥ ar). ar' ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ Z ∧ (translate(cr, revoke))) c. auth_mob_revoke = is_authorizedU mob-revoke (au : AU A , u : USERS A , if op = assign ∧ symbol is a role and in the form x (i.e., the user holds role x)
and in the form x (i.e., the user holds role x)
5:
else if op = assign ∨ revoke ∧ symbol is role and in the formx (i.e., the user doesn't hold role x)
7:
8:
rule_string = rule_string + symbol /* where a symbol is a ∧ or ∨ logical operator */ 10:
end if
Let cr 1 = x 1 ∧ x 2 and, cr 2 =x 1 . cr 1 is evaluated as follows: For any user u ∈ USERS undertaken for assignment,
cr 2 is evaluated as follows: For any user u ∈ USERS undertaken for assignment,
Let can-assign-M and can-assign-IM in URA99 be as follows:
Unlike URA97, there is a notion of prerequisite condition in URA99 revoke model. We have considered same prerequisite conditions for both grant and revoke models instances for simplicity. Prerequisite conditions for URA99 revoke model are evaluated as follows:
cr 1 is evaluated as follows: For any user u ∈ USERS that needs to be revoked,
cr 2 is evaluated as follows: For any user u ∈ USERS that needs to be revoked,
can-revoke-M and can-revoke-IM are as follows:
2) Equivalent URA99 Instance in AURA: An equivalent AURA instance for aforementioned URA99 example instance is presented in this segment. Set and functions:
Authorization rules for assignment and revocation of a user as a mobile member of role can be expressed respectively, as follows:
For any user u ∈ USERS, undertaken for assignment, -is_authorizedU mob-assign (au : AR, u : USERS,
For any user u ∈ USERS that needs to be revoked, -is_authorizedU mob-revoke (au : AR, u : USERS,
Authorization rules for assignment and revocation of a user as an immobile member of role can be expressed respectively, as follows:
For any user u ∈ USERS, undertaken for assignment, -is_authorizedU immob-assign (au : AR, u : USERS,
For any user u ∈ USERS that needs to be revoked, ∪ AATT A , Scope(att), attType(att), is_ordered(att) and H att , For each user u ∈ USERS, and for each aatt ∈ AATT A , aatt(u), For each user u ∈ USERS A , and for each uatt ∈ UATT A , uatt(u), Authorization rule for mobile assign (auth_mob_assign), Authorization rule for mobile revoke (auth_mob_revoke), Authorization rule for immobile assign (auth_immob_assign), and Authorization rule for immobile revoke (auth_immob_revoke).
As shown in Algorithm Map URA99 , there are four main steps required in mapping any instance of URA99 model to AURA instance. In Step 1, sets and functions from URA99 instance are mapped into AURA sets and functions. In Step 2, user attributes and administrative user attribute functions are expressed. There are four regular user attributes, exp_mob_mem, imp_mob_mem, exp_immob_mem, and imp_immob_mem. Each captures, a user's explicit mobile membership, implicit mobile membership, explicit immobile membership and implicit immobile membership on roles, respectively. Admin user attribute aroles captures admin roles assigned to admin users.
Step 3 involves constructing assign-mob-formula and assign-immob-formula in AURA that is equivalent to can-assign-M and can-assign-IM in URA99, respectively, in URA99. Both can-assign-M and can-assign-IM are set of triples. Each triple bears information on whether an admin role can assign a candidate user to a set of roles as a mobile member in the case of canassign-M and, as an immobile member in the case of can-assign-IM. AURA equivalent for can-assign-M is given by is_authorizedU mob-assign (au : AU A , u : USERS A , r : ROLES A ) and an equivalent translation for canassign-IM is given by is_authorizedU immob-assign (au : AU A , u : USERS A , r : ROLES A ). Similarly, In Step 4, revoke-mob-formula equivalent to can-revoke-M and can-revoke-IM are presented. translate 99 is a support routine for Map URA99 that translates prerequisite condition in URA99 into its AURA equivalent. A complete example instance and its corresponding equivalent AURA instances are presented in Section IV-B1 and Section IV-B2, respectively.
C. URA02 in AURA
In this section we present an example instance of URA02 model followed by an equivalent AURA instance. We also present a translation algorithm, Map URA02 that converting URA02 instance to AURA instance.
1) URA02 Instance: In URA02, decision to assign/revoke user-role can be made based on two factors, a user's membership on role or a user's membership in an organization unit. They can be viewed as two different cases. In this example instance we represent roles with r and organization units with x for simplicity. Sets and functions:
• USERS = {u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 } • ROLES = {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 , r 5 , r 6 
Let cr 1 = r 1 ∧ r 2 and, cr 2 = r 1 ∨r 2 ∧ r 3 Case 2: 2 and, cr 4 = x 1 ∨x 2 ∧ x 3 Case 1: cr 1 is evaluated as follows: For any user u ∈ USERS undertaken for assginment, (∃r ≥ r 1 ). (u, r) ∈ UA ∧ (∃r ≥ r 2 ). (u, r) ∈ UA 
Step 4: /* Construct revoke rule in AURA */ a. revoke_formula = φ b. For each (ar, cr, Z) ∈ can_revoke 02 , revoke_formula' = revoke_formula ∨ ((∃ar' ≥ ar). ar' ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ Z) c. auth_revoke = ∀au ∈ AU A , ∀u ∈ USERS A , ∀r ∈ ' Case 2 ' (cr is based on org_units): 6: For each symbol in cr 7: if symbol is an organization unit and in the form x (i.e., the user is a member of organization unit x)
else if symbol an organization unit and in the formx (i.e., the user is not a member of organization unit x)
10:
else 12: rule_string = rule_string + symbol /* where a symbol is a ∧ or ∨ logical operator */ 13: end if 14: end Case End cr 2 is evaluated as follows: For any user u ∈ USERS undertaken for assginment,
Case 2: cr 3 is evaluated as follows: For any user u ∈ USERS undertaken for assginment,
cr 4 is evaluated as follows: For any user u ∈ USERS undertaken for assginment, 
attType(aroles) = set is_ordered(aroles) = True, H aroles = {(ar 1 , ar 2 )} • aroles(u 3 ) = {ar 1 }, aroles(u 4 ) = {ar 2 } For each op in AOP, authorization rule for user to role assignment and revocation can be expressed respectively, as follows: Case 1: For any user u ∈ USERS, undertaken for assignment, -is_authorizedU assign (au : AU, u : USERS, r : ROLES) ≡ ((∃ar ≥ ar 1 ). ar ∈ aroles(u) ∧ r ∈ {r 4 , r 5 
For any user u ∈ USERS undertaken for revocation, -is_authorizedU revoke (au : AU, u : USERS, r : ROLES) ≡ (∃ar ≥ ar 1 ). ar ∈ aroles(u) ∧ r ∈ {r 1 , r 3 , r 4 } Case 2: For any user u ∈ USERS, undertaken for assignment, -is_authorizedU assign (au : AU, u : USERS, r : ROLES)
). x ∈ org_units(u))) For any user u ∈ USERS undertaken for revocation, -is_authorizedU revoke (au : AU, u : USERS, r : ROLES) ≡ (∃ar ≥ ar 1 ). ar ∈ aroles(u) ∧ r ∈ {r 1 , r 3 URA02 , translate 02 translates prerequisite condition in URA02 into its equivalent in AURA. A complete example instance and its corresponding equivalent AURA instances were presented in Section IV-C1 and Section IV-C2, respectively.
D. Uni-ARBAC's URA in AURA
In this section we present an example instance for URA in Uni-ARBAC (URA-Uni) and its equivalent AURA instance. We also present an algorithm that translates any given URA-Uni instance to AURA instance.
1) Uni-ARBAC's URA Instance: This segment presents an instance of URA in Uni-ARBAC model. Sets and functions:
• USERS = {u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 } • ROLES = {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 } • RH = {(r 1 , r 2 ), (r 2 , r 3 )} • UA = {(u 3 , r 1 ), (u 4 , r 3 )} user-pools sets and relations 2 ), (u 3 , up 1 ), (u 4 , up 2 )} Administrative Units and Partitioned Assignments
• user_pools*(au 1 ) = {up 1 } • user_pools*(au 2 ) = {up 1 , up 2 } Administrative User Assignments (au 2 , r 3 )}, attType(adminunit_role) = set, is_ordered(adminunit_role) = False,
For each op in AOP, authorization rule to aassign/revoke a user to/from a role can be expressed as follows: For any user u 2 ∈ USERS undertaken for assignment, -is_authorizedU assign (u 1 : USERS, u 2 : USERS,
For any user u 2 ∈ USERS undertaken for revocation, -is_authorizedU revoke (u 1 : USERS, u 2 : USERS, r : ROLES) ≡ is_authorizedU assign (u 1 : USERS, u 2 : USERS, r : ROLES)
3) Map URA-Uni-ARBAC : Map URA-Uni-ARBAC represents a translation process of any instance of URA in Uni-ARBAC to AURA instance. For clarity, basic sets from URA in Uni-ARBAC are marked with superscript Uni and basic sets from AURA are marked with superscript A.
Map URA-Uni-ARBAC takes URA-Uni instance as input. In particular in involves USERS Uni A shown in Algorithm Map URA-Uni-ARBAC , there are four main steps required in mapping any instance of URA-Uni model to AURA instance. In Step 1, sets and functions from URA-Uni instance are mapped into AURA sets and functions. In Step 2, user attributes and administrative user attribute functions are expressed. There are two user attribute, userpools and userpool_adminunit. userpools captures regular user's binding with a group called user-pools. Regular user attribute userpool_adminunit provides regular user's association with user-pools, and for each user-pool a user is associated with, user-pool's mapping with admin unit. As a result, this attribute captures a regular user's association with an admin unit. We note that we need both the attributes. Although userpool_adminunit captures regular user's association with user-pools and corresponding admin units, it cannot capture user association with userpools which may not have admin unit associated with it. It is the user-pools that are mapped to admin units. There are two admin user attributes, admin_unit and adminunit_role. admin_unit captures UA_admin relation in Uni-ARBAC, and adminunit_role captures admin user's mapping with admin unit and for each admin unit an admin user is mapped to, admin unit's associated roles.
The notion of Uni-ARBAC model is that an admin user to have admin authority (given by UA_admin relation) to assign/revoke regular user and role, if both regular user and role are mapped to that admin unit where admin user has admin authority.
Step 3 involves constructing auth_assign in AURA that is equivalent to can_manage_user_role(u 1 • C is a finite set of object classes with predefined classes: user and role. , where, c ∈ C, and a ∈ {create} ∪ AM(c). RBAC State: Given an RBAC Schema, an RBAC state is given by, <OB, UA, PA, RH>
• OB is a function that maps each class in C to a finite set of object names of that class that currently exists, i.e., OB(c) ⊆ OBJS(c). Let OB(user) = USERS, and OB(role) = ROLES. Set of permissions, P, is given by
relation.
• PA ⊆ P × ROLES, permission-role assignment relation.
• RH ⊆ ROLES × ROLES, partial order in ROLES denoted by RH . Administrative permissions in UARBAC: All the permissions of user u who performs administrative operations can be calculated as follows:
∈ UA ∧ (r 1 RH r 2 ) ∧ (r 2 , p) ∈ PA]} User-Role Administration Operations required to assign user u 1 to role r 1 and to revoke u 1 from role r 1 are respectively listed below:
• grantRoleToUser(r 1 , u 1 One can perform following operation to assign a user u 1 to a role r 1 .
• grantRoleToUser(r 1 , u 1 ) To perform aforementioned operation one needs the following two permissions:
• [user, u 2 , empower] and [role, r 1 , grant] Condition for revoking user-role in URA-UARBAC: One can perform following operation to revoke a user u 1 to a role r 1 .
• revokeRoleFromUser(r 1 , u 1 ) To perform aforementioned operation one needs the one of the following permissions: (role, empower), (user, grant), (role, admin)}, attType(classp) = set, is_ordered(user_am) = False,
For each op in AOP, authorization rule to assign/revoke user-role can be expressed as follows: For any regular user u 2 ∈ USERS taken for assignment, -is_authorizedU assign (u 1 : USERS, u 2 : USERS,
For any regular user u 2 ∈ USERS taken for revocation, -is_authorizedU revoke (u 1 : USERS, u 2 : USERS, 
Step 3: /* Construct assign rule in AURA */ a. assign_formula = ((u 2 , empower) Step 4: /* Construct revoke rule for AURA */ a. revoke_formula = ((u 2 , empower) In this section, we demonstrate that ARPA can intuitively simulate the features of prior PRA models. In particular, we have developed concrete algorithms that can convert any instance of PRA97, PRA99, PRA02, the PRA model in UARBAC, and the PRA model in Uni-ARBAC into an equivalent instance of ARPA. The following sections also present example instances of each of the prior PRA models and their corresponding instances in AURA/ARPA model followed by a formal mapping alorithms.
A. PRA97 in ARPA
In this section, we present an example instance for PRA97 followed by an equivalent ARPA instance. We also present an algorithm that translates any instance of PRA97 into corresponding equivalent ARPA instance.
1) PRA97 Instance: In this section we present an example instance for PRA97. The sets are as follows:
• USERS = {u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 } • ROLES = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 , x 5 , x 6 } • AR = {ar 1 , ar 2 
Prerequisite condition cr 1 is evaluated as follows: For each p that is undertaken for assignment, 
Authorization rule to revoke a permission from a role can be expressed as follows: For any permission p ∈ PERMS undertaken for revocation, -is_authorizedP revoke (au : AU A , p : PERMS A , r : ROLES A ) ≡ (∃ar ≤ ar 1 ). ar ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ ROLES 3) Map PRA97 : Algorithm 6 presents Map PRA97 , which is an algorithm for mapping any PRA97 instance into equivalent ARPA instance. Sets and functions from PRA97 and ARPA are marked with superscripts 97 and A, respectively. Map PRA97 takes PRA97 instance as its input. In particular, input for Map PRA97 2 and, cr 2 =x 1 . Prerequisite condition cr 1 is evaluated as follows: For each p that is undertaken for assignment,
cr 2 is evaluated as follows: For each p that is undertaken for assignment, Step 2 Input: A PRA97 prerequisite condition, cr Output: An equivalent sub-rule for ARPA authorization assign rule.
1: rule_string = φ 2: For each symbol in cr, 3: if symbol is a role and in the form x (i.e., the permission has membership on role x) 4:
else if symbol is a role and in the formx (i.e., the permission doesn't have membership on role x)
rule_string' = rule_string + symbol /* where a symbol is a ∧ or ∨ logical operator */ 9:
end if
Let can-assignp-M and can-assignp-IM in PRA99 be as follows: can-assignp-M = {(ar 1 , cr 1 , {x 4 , x 5 })} can-assignp-IM= {(ar 1 , cr 2 , {x 3 })} For simplicity, same prerequisite conditions are considered for grant and revoke model instances. Prerequisite conditions for PRA99 revoke model are evaluated as follows: cr 1 is evaluated as follows:
cr 2 is evaluated as follows:
Let can-revokep-M and can-revokep-IM sets be as follows:
2) Equivalent PRA99 Instance in ARPA: This section presents an equivalent ARPA instance for the aforementioned PRA99 example instance. Sets and functions:
• AU = {u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 } Input: A PRA99 prerequisite condition (cr), op ∈ {mob-assign, immob-assign, mob-revoke, immob-revoke} Output: An equivalent sub-rule for AURA authorization assign rule. 1: rule_string = φ 2: For each symbol in cr 3: if op = (mob-assign ∨ immob-assign) ∧ symbol is a role and in the form x (i.e., the permission has membership on role x) 4:
symbol is a role and in the form x (i.e., the permission has membership on role x) 5:
else if op = (mob-assign ∨ immob-assign ∨ mob-revoke ∨ immob-revoke) ∧ symbol is role and in the formx (i.e., the permission doesn't have membership on role x) 7:
rule_string = rule_string + symbol /* where a symbol is a ∧ or ∨ logical operator */ 10: end if
• AOP = {mob-assign, immob-assign, mob-revoke, immob-revoke}
• Scope(aroles) = {ar 1 , ar 2 }, attType(aroles) = set, is_ordered(aroles) = True, H aroles = {(ar 1 , ar 2 )} • aroles(u 1 ) = {}, aroles(u 2 ) = {},
Authorization rule to assign a permission as a mobile member of a role can be expressed as follows: To assigning any permission p ∈ PERMS as a mobile member, -is_authorizedP mob-assign (au : AU, p : PERMS,
Authorization rule to revoke a mobile permission from a role can be expressed as follows: To revoke any mobile permission p ∈ PERMS from a role, -is_authorizedP mob-revoke (au : AU, p : PERMS, r : ROLES) ≡ ((∃ar ≥ ar 1 ). ar ∈ aroles(u) ∧ r ∈ {x 3 , x 4 ,
Authorization functions to assign any permission p ∈ PERMS as an immobile member of role can be expressed as follows: To assign any permission p ∈ PERMS as a immobile member, -is_authorizedP immob-assign (au : AU, p : PERMS,
Authorization rule to revoke any immobile permission from a role can be expressed as follows:
To revoke any immobile permission p ∈ PERMS from a role, -is_authorizedP immob-revoke (au : AU, p : PERMS,
3) Map PRA99 : Algorithm 7 is an algorithm for mapping any PRA99 instance into equivalent ARPA instance. Sets and functions from PRA99 and ARPA are marked with textsuperscripts 99 and A, respectively. Map PRA99 takes PRA99 instance as its input. In particular, input for Map PRA99 C. PRA02 in ARPA 1) PRA02 Instance: This section basically consists of PRA02 example instance followed by its equivalent ARPA instance. We also present a mapping algorithm, Map PRA02 . In PRA02, decision about permission-role assignment and revocation is made on the basis of two factors: a permission's membership on role(s) or a permission's membership in organization unit(s). They can be viewed as two different cases. In this example instance we represent roles with r and organization units with x, for simplicity and clarity. Sets and functions:
• USERS = {u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 ' Case 2 ' (cr is based on org_units): 6: For each symbol in cr 7: if symbol is an organization unit and in the form x (i.e., the permission has a membership on organization unit x) 8:
else if symbol an organization unit and in the formx (i.e., the permission doesn't have a membership on organization unit x) 10:
else 12: rule_string = rule_string + symbol /* where a symbol is a ∧ or ∨ logical operator */ 13: end if 14: end Case
• RH = {(r 1 , r 2 ), (r 2 , r 3 ), (r 3 , r 4 ), (r 4 , r 5 ), (r 5 , r 6 
Let cr 1 = r 1 ∧ r 2 and, cr 2 = r 1 ∨r 2 ∧ r 3 Case 2:
Let cr 3 = x 1 ∧ x 2 and, cr 4 = x 1 ∨x 2 ∧ x 3
Prerequisite conditions are evaluated as follows: Case 1: cr 1 is evaluated as follows: For each p that is undertaken for assignment, attType(org_units) = set is_ordered(org_units) = True, H org_units = {(x 3 , x 2 ), (x 2 , x 1 )} • org_units(p 1 ) = {x 1 , x 3 }, org_units(p 2 ) = {x 2 }, org_units(p 3 ) = {x 3 } For each op in AOP, authorization rule for permission to role assignment and revocation can be expressed respectively, as follows:
For any permission p ∈ PERMS undertaken for assignment, -is_authorizedP assign (au : AU, p : PERMS, r : ROLES) ≡ ((∃ar ≥ ar 1 ). ar ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ {r 4 , r 5 } ∧ ((∃r ≤ r 1 ). r ∈ rolesp(p) ∧ (∃r ≤ r 2 ). r ∈ rolesp(p))) ∨ ((∃ar ≥ ar 1 ). ar ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ {r 6 } ∧ ((∃r ≤ r 1 ). r ∈ rolesp(p) ∨ (∃r ≤ r 2 ). r / ∈ rolesp(p) ∧ (∃r ≤ r 3 ). r ∈ rolesp(p)))
For any pemrission p ∈ PERMS undertaken for revocation, -is_authorizedP revoke (au : AU, p : PERMS, r : ROLES) ≡ (∃ar ≥ ar 1 ). ar ∈ aroles(u) ∧ r ∈ {r 1 , r 3 , r 4 } Case 2: or any permission p ∈ PERMS undertaken for assignment, -is_authorizedP assign (au : AU, p : PERMS, r : ROLES) ≡ ((∃ar ≥ ar 1 ). ar ∈ aroles(au) ∧ r ∈ {r 4 , r 5 
For any pemrission p ∈ PERMS undertaken for revocation, -is_authorizedP revoke (au : AU, p : PERMS, r : ROLES) ≡ (∃ar ≥ ar 1 ). ar ∈ aroles(p) ∧ r ∈ {r 1 , r 3 , r 4 } 
∈ adminunit_role(u)) ∧ ∃t 1 , t 2 ∈ Scope(tasks). 
2) Equivalent ARPA instance of PRA in Uni-ARBAC: This section presents an equivalent instance for the example instance presented in section V-D1. Set and functions:
• AU = {u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 } • AOP = {assign, revoke} • ROLES = {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 } • RH = {(r 1 , r 2 ), (r 2 , r 3 ), (r 3 , r 4 )} • PERMS = {p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 2 )} Set of permissions that are mapped to each task in T can be expressed as follows: Let each set be represented with χ i as shown below.
(a)
For each χ i in {χ 1 , χ 2 , χ 3 , χ 4 }, authorization rule for whether an admin user in AU is authorized to assign χ i to a roles r in ROLES is given below:
For each χ i in {χ 1 , χ 2 , χ 3 , χ 4 }, authorization function for whether an admin user in AU is authorized to revoke χ from a roles r ∈ ROLES is given below: -is_authorizedP revoke (u : USERS, χ i : 2 PERMS , r : ROLES) ≡ is_authorizedP assign (u : USERS, χ i : 2 PERMS , r : ROLES)
3) Map PRA-Uni-ARBAC : Map PRA-Uni depicted as Algorithm 9 translates instance of PRA in Uni-ARBAC to an equivalent instance of ARPA. Sets and functions from PRA-Uni and ARPA are marked with superscript Uni and superscript A, repectively.
It takes following sets and functions from PRA-Uni as an input that includes USERS Uni Map PRA-Uni consists of four steps to complete translation. In Step 1 sets and functions from PRA-Uni instance are mapped to ARPA instance. In Uni-ARBAC, both admin users and regular users belong to same set, USERS Uni . Thus, USERS Uni is mapped to AU A . In Step 2, admin user attributes and pemrission attributes are defined. There are two admin user attributes: admin_unit and adminunit_role. admin_unit captures the TA_admin Uni relation in URA-Uni, and adminunit_role captures admin user's mapping with admin unit, and the roles mapped to that admin unit. There are two permission attributes: tasks and task_adminu. Attribute tasks gives a mapping between permission and tasks. That is for each permission p, tasks(p) yields set of tasks it is mapped to. For a given pemission, attribute task_adminu gives its mapping with tasks, and admin units that each task is mapped to.
Step 3 constructs an assignment rule equivalent to can_manage_task_role(u : USERS Uni , t: T Uni , r: ROLES Uni ) in Uni-ARBAC. In PRA-Uni, it evaluates if an admin user u can assign/revoke a task t to/from a role r if admin user u has Task_admin
Uni relation with some admin unit au to which task t and role r are mapped. An ARPA equivalent assignment rule auth_assign is expressed in Step • C is a finite set of object classes with predefined classes: user and role.
• OBJS(c) is a function that gives all possible names for objects of the class c ∈ C. Let USERS = OBJS(user) and ROLES = OBJS(role) • AM(c) is function that maps class c to a set of access modes that can be applied on objects of class c. /* Construct assign rule in ARPA */ a. assign_formula = ((object_id(p), admin) ∈ object_am(au) ∧ (r, empower) ∈ role_am(au)) ∨ ((file, admin) ∈ classp(au) ∧ (r, empower) ∈ role_am(au)) ∨ ((object_id(p), admin) ∈ object_am(au) ∧ (role, empower) ∈ classp(au)) ∨ (file, admin) ∈ classp(au) ∧ (role, empower) ∈ classp(au)) /* Construct revoke rule for ARPA */ a. revoke_formula = (object_id(p), admin) ∈ object_am(au) ∨ (r, admin) ∈ role_am(au)) ∨ (file, admin) ∈ classp(au) ∨ (role, admin) ∈ classp(au)) b. auth_revoke = is_authorizedP revoke (au : AU A , p : PERMS A , r : ROLES A ) ≡ revoke_formula Access modes for two predefined classes user and role are fixed. By observation we find it relevant to consider files as resource objects. We take file as example resource object to which we will define access.
AM(user) = {empower, admin} AM(role) = {grant, empower, admin} AM(file) = {read, write, append, execute, admin} RBAC Permissions: There are two kinds of permissions in this RBAC model:
• Object permissions of the form, [c, o, a], where c ∈ C, o ∈ OBJS(c), a ∈ AM(c).
• Class permissions of the form, [c, a], where, c ∈ C, and a ∈ {create} ∪ AM(c). RBAC State: Given an RBAC Schema, an RBAC state is given by, <OB, UA, PA, RH>
• OB is a function that maps each class in C to a finite set of object names of that class that currently exists, i.e., OB(c) ⊆ OBJS(c).
Let OB(user) = USERS, OB(role) = ROLES and, let OB(file) = FILES Set of permissions, P, is given by P = {[c, o, a] | c ∈ C ∧ o ∈ OBJS(c) ∧ a ∈ AM(c)} ∪ {[c, a] | c ∈ C ∧ a ∈ {create} ∪ AM(c)} • UA ⊆ USERS × ROLES, user-role assignment relation.
• authorized_perms[u] = {p ∈ P | ∃r 1 , r 2 ∈ R [(u, r 1 )
∈ UA ∧ (r 1 RH r 2 ) ∧ (r 2 , p) 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented our design for attribute based administration of RBAC (AARBAC). We developed AURA model for user-role assignment and ARPA model for permission-role assignment. We then supported these models with their extensive example instances and mapping algorithms. Both the models utilized attributes of RBAC components in making assignment or revocation decision. Role-role assignment (RRA) is an essential part of RBAC administration. We view attribute based RRA as our immediate future work.
One of the motivations behind our design approach for AURA and ARPA models was to make them sufficient enough to represent prior ARBAC models. For that matter, we have presented Map URA97 , Map URA99 , Map URA02 , MAP URA-Uni-ARBAC and Map URA-UARBAC algorithms that demonstrated m mapping of prior URA model instances into their respective equivalent AURA instances. Similarly, we presented Map PRA97 , Map PRA99 , Map PRA02 , MAP PRA-Uni-ARBAC and Map PRA-UARBAC algorithms that demonstrated mapping of prior PRA model instances into their equivalent ARPA instances. We note that our models are not limited to expressing prior ARBAC models and carries the potential to express more.
